Daniel Dahlstrom, <Heidegger's Concept of Truth> 2장 발췌

Daniel Dahlstrom, Heidegger's Concept of Truth, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 

서론, 1장

[…] ’logical prej­udice’ refers to the thesis, as Heidegger puts it, “that the genuine ‘lo­cus’ of truth is the judgment” (SZ 226). (xvi-xvii)

The main objective of the following study is to elaborate Heidegger's early conception of truth (formulated in the Marburg lectures and in Being and Time) as it proceeds from his critique of a particular history of the logical prejudice. Heidegger argues that the disclosedness of be­ing-here (Da-sein) or, more precisely, the disclosure of the timeliness of being-here, is a truth more fundamental than any propositional truth. In this way he aims to outflank what he sees as the hallmarks of tradi­tional alethiology and ontology, the companion conceptions of truth as a proposition’s property and being as an entity’s presence or onhand­ness. While the maneuver meets with some success, I argue that the de­gree of success depends upon a tacit but unexplained complementar­ity between truth as disclosedness and propositional truth (between ontological and ontic determinations of truth). In other words, even in the exposure of the logical prejudice, the latter remains in some sense a prejuge legitime. (xviii)

He charges, first, that Husserl’s phe­nomenological analysis of truth remains enmeshed in a version of the logical prejudice and, second, that Husserl, contrary to his principles, fails to inquire into the manner of being of intentionality or, for that matter, into the sense of being at all. (51)

---

2.1. 진리에 대한 현상학적 개념: 후설과의 비판적 대결

★1925년의 강의에서 하이데거는 현상학의 결정적 발견 3가지—지향성, 범주적 직관, 아프리오리의 원본적 의미—를 열거하고 해설한다.

“With intentionality, the genuine field of things [Sachfeld] is procured; with the a priori, the aspect [Sachhinsicht] in terms of which the structures of intentionality are considered; and the categorial intu­ition, as the original manner of grasping these structures, presents the manner of treatment [Behandlungsart], the method of this research” (P109, 103ff). (101)

① In Heidegger’s eyes, Husserl succeeds, like no modern thinker before him, in firmly grasping that distinction and thus providing a suitable analysis of human knowledge. In the process Husserl breaks through the Cartesian cognitive model, shattering the image of the “glassy essence” invoked over centuries to portray the human mind. [...] Evidence is a specific intentional act, but pre­cisely the act the object of which is the identity of what is meant and what is intuited. […] This view of evidence is, of course, only intelligible on the supposition of the intentional[객체지향적, 비표상적] character of evidence. (65)

In Heidegger’s presentation of this doctrine of evidence, he correspondingly emphasizes that the truth is experienced in the evidence even where the identity itself is not thematically grasped. […] Heidegger stresses this conception of the originally unthematic expe­rience of the truth not least because his own account of truth essentially builds upon it. As discussed in greater detail in the next chapter of the present study, what Heidegger construes as the original truth is the dis­closure of the sense of being, a truth that is “understood” prethemati­cally both in the (unthematic) use of entities and in the (explicitly the­matic) attempt to comprehend them. (67)

제 6논리연구에서의 후설의 진리 개념의 영향 ➔ Corresponding to what is meant and given in Husserl’s first concept of truth are, respectively, the manners in which an entity or state of affairs is absent and makes itself present. The identity of what is meant and given is, from the standpoint of the entity or state of affairs, its emergence from absence into presence. In this fash­ion, as Heidegger sees it, Husserl’s conception of the primary sense of truth - a conception that, by his own account, is tantamount to the sense of being - “breaks through” not only a Cartesian model of know­ing, but also a conception of being as presence that allegedly haunts the entire tradition of Western philosophy, beginning with Plato and Aris­totle. The fact that Husserl himself does not grasp the full ontological import of his first concept of truth lies at the heart of Heidegger's criticisms of Husserl’s phenomenology(see2.21 below.) (70)

판단이 아닌 단순지각작용도 진리의 체험이 될 수 있다. ➔ In this way he[Husserl] makes clear that truth is not only a question of judgment (namely, an assertion-fulfillment, the corresponding state of affairs), but also a question of “nominal acts” that find their fulfillment through the perception of “absolute” objects [...] According to Husserl, nonrelational acts of naming or at­ tributing “emerge” from the perception of a state of affairs that can it­ self be elaborated in the form of a judgment. (71-2) 

② 후설은 범주적 직관의 개념을 통해 존재의 문제를 건드렸다. ➔ But how do matters stand in the case of words like ‘is’ and ‘and’? Is there a respective fulfillment for each term, corresponding to what each is intended to say? Can one speak of the evidence or truth of what is meant by these expressions? (79)

[…] the great virtue of Husserl’s doctrine of categorial intuition in Heidegger's estimation lies precisely in providing an explanation of the objectivity of logical forms, an explanation that does not confuse that objectivity with the mind's workings and yet has nothing to do with a so­ called intellectual intuition. (75-6)

[…] Husserl's ac­count of categorial intuitions works against competing theories on three fronts: positivist[범주를 감각으로 환원], Platonist[범주를 감각과 무관하게 지각되는 것으로 간주], and Kantian[범주를 직관의 대상으로 보지 않음]. (77)

감각적이기만 한 직관은 추상자이다 ➔ Heidegger places so much weight on the role of categorial intuition that the difference between it and sensory intuition is obscured or even effaced. This slant is apparent in Heidegger’s claim that “the simple, straight­ forward perception, that one likes to designate as ‘sensory perception,’ is saturated in itself with categorial intuition” (P 81). […] he[Heidegger] makes no secret of the fact that he regards the sensory intuition as an abstractum. “The con­crete intuition that explicitly yields an object is never an isolated sen­sory perception with a single layer, but rather is always a layered, that is to say, categorially determinate intuition” (P 93). Heidegger accord­ingly rejects the notion that objects are somehow first intuited and then subsequently discussed (named or classified). (84-85)

Husserl's first and most basic definition of truth, which he himself regarded as more properly a conception of being, is experienced prethematically in a categorial intuition, as the identity of what is meant and perceived, an identity that corresponds to an entity's emergence out of absence into presence. According to the existential analysis of Being and Time, a distinctive temporal presence and absence is understood preontologically as the basic sense and truth of ‘being­ here.’ These remarks suggest that for Heidegger not only being, but also time might be the “object” of something analogous to categorial intuition. (92)

하이데거가 본 범주적 직관 개념의 존재론적 함축 (1) Husserl’s doc­trine of categorial intuition thus signifies for Heidegger the definitive break with the attempt to explain what is not directly (sensorily) intu­ited as the result of a capacity of or a reflection by the human subject. (95)

(2) Previously, there were only two, equally untenable alternatives: either the objectivity of universals was denied on the assumption that it was impossible to speak of their reality as one does about the reality of things, or the reality of universals was maintained on the basis of the undeniability of likenesses. The doctrine of the acts of ideation, however, shows how the objectivity of the universal can be explained as the being of the ideal, without confusing it with the reality of a thing given to sensory perception. Indeed, the doctrine of categorial intuitions introduces an expanded idea of objectivity. (96)

(3) “The objective ways” in which the reality of a thing as well as the ideal being of a state of affairs or a categorial form can themselves become genuinely objective are initially unthematic. [...] Viewed from this vantage point, the doctrine of categorial intuition provides […] the key to the way the various manners of being originally disclose themselves and are, correspondingly, to be interpreted. [...] Husserl’s accomplishment, he continues, lies precisely in showing, by means of his doctrine of categorial intuition, how being is given (“phenomenally present in the category”) (96)

③ 아프리오리의 진정한 의미 ➔ Since Descartes, the a priori is associated with subjectivity. However, with discoveries of intentionality and acts of ideation, the a priori must be decoupled from cognition in­ternal and immanent to the subject alone (res cogitans). […] From the universal reach of the a priori and its indifference to subjectivity, Heidegger deduces that the a priori is not something inferred. The manner of access to the a priori is a direct identification of it in a straightforward intuition […] (98-99)

While not synonymous with ‘being,’ the ‘a priori’ characterizes being in contrast to entities. [...] In other words, that character, in terms of which not the entity, but the entity's manner of being, is to be understood, is time. (100-101)

More precisely, in the wake of Husserl’s discoveries, phenomenology must become fundamental-ontological research into intentionality (Sachfeld), with respect to intentionality’s a priori structure, that is, the aspect (Sachhin­sicht) that discloses itself originally in the unthematic act of categorial intuition (Behandlungsart). The aspect of intentionality that so discloses itself and constitutes its a priori structure is the sense of its being. (102)

---

2.2 후설의 현상학에 대한 비판

★후설은 지향성 개념을 통해 서양철학의 전통적인 진리 개념에 도전했지만, 그 역시 아리스토텔레스로부터 비롯한 논리학의 편견에 사로잡혀있었으며, 불가해한 존재의 의미를 활용했고, 자신의 철학의 존재론적 함축을 온전히 이해하지 못했다. 이때 논리학의 편견과 눈앞에-있음으로의 존재의 평면화는 서로를 강화한다(130).

① 진리 개념의 역동성 상실로 인해, (사태는 판단의 상관자이므로) 논리학의 편견을 견지하는 로체의 이론과 거의 비슷해졌다.

사태연관과 진리연관 사이의 혼동 ➔ The immediate focus of Heidegger’s criticism is Husserl’s use of the expression ‘state of affairs’ for the objective cor­relate of the intuition that, according to the first concept of truth, ful­fills a judgment. Characterizing truth - the identity of what is meant and given - as a “state of affairs” implies that the relation is to be understood along the same lines as “the state of affairs ’S is p,’ ‘the board is black,’ the relation of black and board” (L 112). Heidegger accordingly re­proaches Husserl for confusing “the state of truth” (or the truth rela­tion: Wahrverhalt) with “the state of affairs” (or the relation within a thing: Sachverhalt). (105)

비일관성의 혐의 ➔ However, when the truth (itself a dynamic relation) is construed as a state of affairs, it is ef­fectively mistaken - Heidegger is maintaining - for the static counter­part to a proposition. States of affairs, it bears reiterating, are literally part-whole relations obtaining between a thing and its properties. Insofar as these relations can be articulated by judgments, can correspond to them, and, even more importantly, can be iterated like the judgments themselves, they seem to enjoy a kind of ideal status. The truth thus comes to be viewed as itself a kind of thing (hypokeimenon) that possesses various, transient attributes (symbebekos), that is, the state of affairs (ideal proposition, type) that remains the same despite different instantia­tions (sentences, tokens) of it. (106)

[…] it remains true that Husserl oscillates between dynamic (indeed, in a certain sense pragmatic) and static conceptions of truth, that is to say, between truth as the identification (what Heidegger calls Wahrverhalt) and as the enduring identity (Sachverhalt) of what is meant and what is given. (107)

[…] Husserl’s talk of the equivalence of con­cepts of “truth” and “being” is tacitly and unreflectively oriented toward a conception of a way of being that is proper to entities of a particular sort. (108)

②존재의 문제를 망각함으로써 현상학으로서 해야 할 일을 하지 못했다.

[…] he[Husserl] fails to address questions […] What sort of being is intentionality? Does intention­ality have a distinctive way of being and if so, what is it? What does it mean to say that the sphere of intentionality exists? What does it mean to say of anything that it exists? Is there some horizon, context, or per­haps a purpose that principally enables, frames, or even shapes our uses of ‘being’ and its cognates? (109-110)

Q. 존재는 이해되기 위해서는 주어져야 하기 때문에 존재론을 하기에 가장 적합한 방법론이 현상학이라는 데 대해서는 동의할 수 있다. 그러나 그렇다고 해서 현상학을 수행한다고 무조건 존재론을 수행해야 하는 것은 아닌 것처럼 보인다.

★환원에 대한 비판

하이데거도 초월론적 환원을 운용하는 것처럼 보이므로, 환원에 대한 그의 태도는 양가적이다. ➔ Thus, the reduction in Being and Time is transcendental insofar as the analysis of being-here, in the first place, explicitly sets itself off from ontic disciplines such as anthropology, psychology, and biology, and, secondly, brackets traditional concepts of being (such as ousia, being­ on-hand, substance, and the like). While pure and material eidetic dis­ciplines are also bracketed, so, too, is the self of the phenomenologist in a deliberate attempt to understand the distinctive eidos of Dasein, not as an instance of some species, but in its “respective mineness” (SZ 136). There is even reason to posit a third level of epoche in Being and Time, what may be dubbed an “authentic” reduction, exemplifed in the second half of the work, that is carried out only in the wake of identi­fying and then bracketing inauthentic existence. (113)

Despite the positive appropriation just mentioned, he later claims without qualifi­cation in the same lecture that the reduction is fundamentally unsuited for determining the sense of ‘being’ positively and, indeed, precisely because it does not attend to what ultimately is meant by ‘conscious-be­ing’ (Bewußtsein). (114)

① 내재로의 환원은 내재와 초재의 이분법을 전제한다. This dualism is quite questionable for the phenomenological reduction, not only be­ cause of the potential aporia just noted (namely, one conscious-being, yet belonging to two spheres of being), but also because it contradicts intentionality's achievement, presupposed by the reduction. […] In Ideas I Husserl maintains that “a fundamental distinction . . . be­tween being as experience and being as thing” emerges from the difference, underlying the epoche, between the immanent experiences attained through reflection and the transcendent perceptions of things (ld I 76). Although this formulation of the dualism is specified (in contrast to the first one) in epistemological rather than psychophysical terms, both formulations ultimately come to the same questionable ontologi­cal difference. (115)

지향적 초재와 순수 초재를 구분할 수 있는가? 의식과 현실이 나뉘어진다는 것 자체가 하나의 선입견이며, 이는 지향성의 원리과 배리된다. Each dualism calls forth the question of the sense and manner of be­ing without posing it. The presumption seems reasonable that there is a concept or phenomenon on the basis of which the opposites can be grasped and their opposition (their relation to one another) estab­lished. The dualism with which Husserl introduces the phenomeno­logical method is thus a highly questionable presupposition from the standpoint of the method since it bypasses the question of the concep­tion of being that the method invokes. In other words, as a consequence of the dualism, a sense of being is stipulated in a purely formal way as a concept spanning the opposite regions of being but unavailable for consideration itself through the phenomenological method. (115)

② 환원의 텔로스인 ‘절대적 의식’의 개념에서 발견되는 존재망각 ➔ […] what it means to assert that consciousness […] is “absolute.” […] Consciousness is absolute in the sense that it is immanent, im­ mediate, spontaneous, and pure. (117) ➔ 그러나 의식은 스스로를 이렇게 드러내보이지 않는다. 이 속성들은 사태 자체에 대한 기술에서 온 게 아니라 절대적 학문을 세우겠다는 특수한 의도에 의해 부착된 것이다. In other words, Husserl elaborates these four characters of consciousness with a view to determin­ing, not what it means for consciousness “to be,” but what the structure of consciousness is insofar as it constitutes and encompasses the region of an absolute science. (119)

③ 환원의 수행과정에서 의식/지향성의 존재망각

형상을 쫓느라 존재의 방식 도외시 ➔ The essence in the sense of whatness is precisely “the grasped, given, constituted,” that, while well suited to the determinations of pure con­sciousness as a scientific object, reveals precious little of its way of be­ing. The operative difference here is that between what something is and that it is. […] In other words, in the in­terest of defining some essential character, it is quite possible to ignore questions about the way in which an entity (entitas) has that character and, at the same time, a manner of being that is distinguishable from that essence. In a corresponding way, as a consequence of the eidetic reduction, the existence of consciousness is left out of consideration in order to ascertain the alleged “whatness” of pure consciousness. (121-122)

Q. 후설이 ‘존재방식’의 본질을 탐구한다고 볼 수 있지 않을까?

그 결과 전통적인 존재 개념이 밀반입되어 환원의 철저성 훼손 ➔ In the final analysis, however, the de­termination of the essence does not succeed without a specific con­ception of the manner of being. As long as the manner of being of con­sciousness is not itself questioned, a particular concept of being - and, indeed, one that is possibly quite unsuitable - continues nolens volens to affect the determination of the essence. From this perspective Husserl's version of the epoche does not do justice to the question of being, be­cause it does not carry out the reduction radically enough; that is to say, it neglects to put out of play a traditional concept of essence (T 266). (122)

환원의 시작점도 자연주의화되어있다. ➔ According to this conception of the natural attitude, consciousness is presumably something that accrues to human beings as animate beings, appearing in the world as natural objects. But by this means, Heidegger complains, the point of departure of the Husserlian epoche in no way designates a natural mode of experi­ence, but rather “a quite determinate theoretical stance . . . for which every entity is construed a priori in terms of a regulated procession of events in the spatial-temporal disjunction of the world” (P 155f; EpF 271f). In this connection Heidegger also makes the intriguing obser­vation that no attitude is original, but must first be obtained from a natural way of behaving. (123)

★절대적 학의 이념 자체에 대한 반대 ➔ In fact, his use of the term ‘naturalism’ is dif­ferent from common contemporary construals of it as a program of in­terpreting all phenomena according to the methods and findings of natural sciences. Heidegger is referring instead to what he regards as HusserI’s effort to […] absolutize itself by se­curing unimpeachable evidence and certainty in the form of princi­ples. Heidegger thus faults Husserl for orienting phenomenology toward the idea of an absolutely certain science and construing consciousness, its basic theme, too much in conformity with epistemologi­cal and psychological approaches [of the natural science] to it (EpF 52f, 58f). The entire con­text of Husserl’s inquiry is theoretical, Heidegger charges; it is supposed to establish a new discipline “in place of natural science,” without asking “whether such a discipline makes any sense at all” (EpF 81f). (124-125) ➔ 이 이념에 대한 염려에 짓눌려 인간 실존에 무관심(135)

Q. 자연과학(이 자신의 지위로 설정한 것)과 같은 절대적 학문이라는 이상은 왜 문제적인가?