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철학/현상학

Brice R. Wachterhauser(ed.), <Phenomenology and Skepticism> 발췌

Brice R. Wachterhauser(ed.), Phenomenology and Skepticism : Essays in Honor of James M. Edie, Northwestern University Press, 1996. 모든 강조는 나의 것.

Introduction: The Shipwreck of Apodicticity? Phenomenology's Journey "beyond" Skepticism(Brice R. Wachterhauser)

"I would begin by pointing out that Husserl understands the deepest form of skepticism to be the denial of apodicticity or necessary and universal truths."(2)

"He laid the groundwork for the overcoming of skepticism, as well as for the overcoming of his own demand of apodicticity and presuppositionlessness because he fearlessly and ruthlessly pursued the conditions of human knowledge to such a point that his program of discovering an Archimedean point for all cognition allegedly collapsed under its own weight, and along with it skepticism as its inverted image[후설의 초기 요구와 회의주의는 모두 확실한 지식만이 지식이라는 모델을 따른다]. What Husserl made it possible for these disciples to see (but which he himself perhaps never saw the full implications of) was that both freedom and finitude are each in their own way factual conditions of human understanding. As factual conditions of understanding they are inherently contingent and as such they can never be grasped with apodicticity.*** Moreover, freedom and finitude can never be grasped with the indubitable clarity and distinction or the transparent presuppositionlessness such principles must evince if they are to function as unshakable starting points on which all truths can somehow be built up. Instead, freedom and finitude are 'facts,' [...] Thus it is argued that in one sense at least Husserl's program of discovering the indubitable foundations of knowledge is wrecked on the rocks of finitude, because these foundations never present themselves as necessary and presuppositionless. Instead what they show is that all knowledge contains within it both an inescapable element of contingency and doubt and unclarified depths that can never be put to rest without perhaps undermining the possibility of human understanding itself. [...] the denial of certainty and presuppositionlessness does not lead to skepticism because the possibility of knowledge as such is not denied when certainty and presuppositionlessness is denied."(3-4) ➔ ①궁극적인 자기책임을 지는 철학자가 되겠다는 결심의 우연성(자유)이 철학의 필증적 시작에 대한 후설의 요구와 충돌한다.* ②과거나 미래와 같이 비필증적으로만 알려지는 지평이 인식의 필연적 조건이다(유한성). ③이처럼 철학적 인식의 시작점인 자유와 유한성이 전제 없고 필증적인 지식을 불가능하게 만들기 때문에, 무전제성 및 필증성은 충족될 수 없는 이상이다. 그러나 비모순율과 같은 논리적 조건들은 여전히 (무전제적이지는 않을지언정) 필증적인 것 같다.**

*Q. 정말 그러한가?

★***Q. 자유와 유한성의 내용은 비필증적이지만, 형식은 필증적이지 않은가? 그것으로는 불충분한가? '모든 인식은 지평에 의해 유한하게 제한된다'는 필증적 진리를 철학의 시작점으로 삼으면 안 되는가? 왜 그 진리는 필증적 시작점이 되기에 부족하다는 것인가?

**★Q. 무전제성과 필증성은 어떻게 구분되는가? 특정한 전제를 만족시킬 경우에만 반드시 따라나오는 결과의 속성도 필증성이라고 부를 수 있을까?


Thoughts on Phenomenology and Skepticism(Robert Sokolowski)

"Husserl does not only show that skepticism is untenable; he also shows how truth is possible."(43)

"One of the factors that give phenomenology resources against skepticism is that it is especially sensitive to the limitations of evidences. Phenomenology is concerned not only with the actual presence of identities, but also with the fringes of absence, of possible misinterpretation, of unclarity and ambiguity, of mediate as opposed to immediate givenness. Everything that can be recognized and confirmed can also be taken erroneously, according to a manner appropriate to the kind of thing in question. […] Precisely by taking note of limitations, phenomenology protects itself against the dogmatism that skepticism fears and thus inoculates itself against skepticism. And by accounting for such limitations, phenomenology can avoid the desperation of skepticism, which is so impressed by the possibility of error and confusion that it refrains even from judicious assertions. Phenomenology possesses a rational fear of that which skepticism fears irrationally."(46)

"This intensely introspective picture, when assumed at the beginning of philosophy, strongly reinforces the skeptical and psychologistic position. Husserl’s teaching on intentionality is meant to shatter the picture[주객분리], but it shows the effects of having started with it."(50)

"Skepticism will always be part of the cultural scene, struggling against dogmatism. The two extremes, undershooting and overshooting the evidence of things, will always be played off one against the other, and each bespeaks a naiveté grounded in the natural attitude. Neither position attains the moderation of philosophy, which acknowledges, contemplates, and describes the evidence that things give to us, but only within the limits that are proper to them."(51)


The Epistemological Significance of Husserl's Theory of Intentionality(Harrison Hall)

"[…] none of these questions is a question of fact. They are all questions about the meaning contents of natural experience and how they enable us to make sense of things so as to give rise to the various swords of natural knowledge-claims."(59)

"What is right about [the Cartesian] skeptical doubt is that it tends to destroy the natural context of experience and to catapult us from the world of fact to the realm of meaning. What is wrong is that it does not do so self-consciously. It is at the level of meaning, with our natural belief in the existence of the world suspended, that we can see what it is for us to intend things as acutally existing, understand what it means for something in our experience to count as part of that world. What we can't do from the level of meaning is make factual claims about real existence or our natural knowledge of it."(60) ➔ 사실과 의미, 자연과 철학, 실재와 이념의 분리가 후설의 인식론적 공로이다. 반면 데카르트는 이를테면 외부세계의 '사실적인' 실존을 주장하게 됨으로써 초월론적 실재론의 아버지가 되었다.

"The relevant answers to the philosophical questions about the world and our knowledge of it will tell us what it means for things to exist and what kind of evidence experience must provide in order for them to count as real and our beliefs about them to count as knowledge."(62)


Husserl's Critique of Relativism(David Detmer)

"Thus, to attempt to explain logic in terms of psychology is to explain the more certain by the less certain. It is, in short, to commit the fallacy of obscurum per obscurius."(109)

"Finally, it seems to me that Bridges[포스트모더니스트] goes wrong by assuming, without argument, that a knower must achieve a standpoint stripped of all particularity in order to have access to knowledge that is not thoroughly conditioned by the particularity of the knower. But an alternative possiblity, defended at length by Husserl but ignored by Bridges, is that it is possible, even from a particular standpoint, to see truths which transcend that standpoint, and which further transcend the particularities of what is seen, so that the knower 'rubs up against' truths which are not only objective, but also universal and necessary."(110) ➔ 테니스공이 와인병에 들어가지 않는다는 사실의 인식이 내 존재의 역사성에 의해 대체 어떤 영향을 받느냐는 반박.