폴 리쾨르, <해석학과 인문과학> 1부 요약 및 발췌

Paul Ricoeur, ed. & trans. by John B. Thompson, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, Cambridge University Press, 2016.

---

해석학의 과제

해석학은 중립성의 환상을 폭로한다. ➔ The presentation which follows is therefore not neutral, in the sense of being free from presuppositions. Indeed, hermeneutics itself puts us on guard against the illusion or pretension of neutrality. (3)

해석학의 일반화는 해석학의 존재론화와 함께 간다. ➔ But this movement of deregionalisation[일반 해석학] cannot be pressed to the end unless at the same time the properly epistemological concerns of hermeneutics – its efforts to achieve a scientific status – are subordinated to ontological preoccupations, whereby understanding ceases to appear as a simple mode of knowing in order to become a way of being and a way of relating to beings and to being. The movement of deregionalisation is thus accompanied by a movement of radicalisation, by which hermeneutics becomes not only general but fundamental. (4)

해석은 일의성을 지향한다. ➔ Sensitivity to context is the necessary complement and ineluctable counterpart of polysemy. But the use of contexts involves, in turn, an activity of discernment which is exercised in the concrete exchange of messages between interlocutors, and which is modelled on the interplay of question and answer. This activity of discernment is properly called interpretation; it consists in recognising which relatively univocal message the speaker has constructed on the polysemic basis of the common lexicon. To produce a relatively univocal discourse with polysemic words, and to identify this intention of univocity in the reception of messages: such is the first and most elementary work of interpretation. (4)

모든 해석학은 비판적인 동시에 낭만적이다. ➔ Because it was restricted to investigating the universal conditions of objectivity in physics and ethics, Kantianism[대상을 탐구하기 위해 인식 조건을 탐구해야 한다는 주의] could bring to light only an impersonal mind, bearer of the conditions of possibility of universal judgements. Hermeneutics could not add to Kantianism without taking from Romantic philosophy its most fundamental conviction, that mind is the creative unconscious at work in gifted individuals. Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical programme thus carried a double mark: Romantic by its appeal to a living relation with the process of creation, critical by its wish to elaborate the universally valid rules of understanding. Perhaps hermeneutics is forever marked by this double filiation – Romantic and critical, critical and Romantic. (6)

슐라이어마허: 문법적 해석과 심리학적 해석 병행 ➔ Schleiermacher makes this clear: to consider the common language is to forget the writer; whereas to understand an individual author is to forget his language, which is merely passed over. Either we perceive what is common, or we perceive what is peculiar. (7)

역사학: ‘삶’의 해석학 시작 ➔ Between Schleiermacher and Dilthey were the great German historians of the nineteenth century: L. Ranke, J.G. Droysen, etc. From then on, the text to be interpreted was reality itself and its interconnection (Zusammenhang). The question of how to understand a text from the past is preceded by another question: how is an historical interconnection to be conceived? Before the coherence of the text comes the coherence of history, considered as the great document of mankind, as the most fundamental expression of life. (8)

딜타이: 역사학에 자연과학과 같은 인식론적 지위를 부여하고자 하는 열망 & 그것의 특수성을 충분히 강조해야 한다는 사명. 자연과학은 인간의 정신과 자연현상 사이의 차이를 무시함. 설명과 이해의 대립 ➔ It is in the sphere of psychology that Dilthey searches for the distinctive feature of understanding. Every human science – and by that Dilthey means every modality of the knowledge of man which implies an historical relation – presupposes a primordial capacity to transpose oneself into the mental life of others. For in natural knowledge, man grasps only phenomena distinct from himself, the fundamental ‘thingness’ of which escapes him. In the human order, on the other hand, man knows man; however alien another man may be to us, he is not alien in the sense of an unknowable physical thing. The difference of status between natural things and the mind dictates the difference of status between explanation and understanding. (9)

객관적 해석이라는 문제 ➔ Hermeneutics thus constitutes the objectified layer of understanding, thanks to the essential structures of the text. But the counterpart of a hermeneutical theory founded on psychology is that psychology remains its ultimate justification. The autonomy of the text, which will be at the centre of our own reflections, can only be a provisional and superficial phenomenon. The question of objectivity thus persists in Dilthey’s work as a problem which is both ineluctable and insoluble. (11)

Dilthey shared with the latter the view that life is essentially a creative dynamism; but, in contrast to the philosophy of life, he held that the creative dynamism cannot know itself and can interpret itself only by the detour of signs and works. A fusion was thus effected in Dilthey’s work between the concept of dynamism and that of structure: life appears as a dynamism which structures itself. In this way, the later Dilthey tried to generalise the concept of hermeneutics, anchoring it ever more deeply in the teleology of life. (12)

딜타이에서 하이데거로: 해석학의 존재론화 ➔ This presupposition, dominant in Dilthey’s work, implies that hermeneutics is one variety of the theory of knowledge and that the debate between explanation and understanding can be contained within the limits of the Methodenstreit [methodological dispute] dear to the neo-Kantians. The presupposition of hermeneutics construed as epistemology is precisely what Heidegger and Gadamer place in question. Their contribution cannot be regarded, therefore, as a pure and simple prolongation of Dilthey’s enterprise; rather it must be seen as an attempt to dig beneath the epistemological enterprise itself, in order to uncover its properly ontological conditions. […] instead of asking ‘how do we know?’ it will be asked ‘what is the mode of being of that being who exists only in understanding?’(14)

하이데거: 과학화에 대한 반대 ➔ Dasein designates the place where the question of being arises, the place of manifestation; the centrality of Dasein is simply that of a being which understands being. […] Consequently, to display the constitution of Dasein is not at all ‘to ground by derivation’, as in the methodology of the human sciences, but ‘to unfold the foundation by clarification’ (see SZ para. 3). An opposition is thus established between ontological foundation, in the sense just described, and epistemological grounding. (14-15)

타인의 정신에 대한 이해에서 세계에 대한 이해로 ➔ Hermeneutics is not a reflection on the human sciences, but an explication of the ontological ground upon which these sciences can be constructed. […] The foundations of the ontological problem are sought in the relation of being with the world and not in the relation with another. Understanding, in its primordial sense, is implicated in the relation with my situation, in the fundamental understanding of my position within being. (15)

주관주의의 타파 ➔ The question of the world takes the place of the question of the other. In thereby making understanding worldly, Heidegger de-psychologises it. This shift has been completely misunderstood in the so-called existentialist interpretations of Heidegger. The analyses of care, anguish and being-towards-death were taken in the sense of a refined existential psychology, applied to uncommon states of mind. It was not sufficiently recognised that these analyses are part of a meditation on the worldliness of the world, and that they seek essentially to shatter the pretension of the knowing subject to set itself up as the measure of objectivity. (16)

사르트르와 하이데거의 차이 ➔ What is important here is not the existential moment of responsibility or free choice, but rather the structure of being which underlies the problem of choice. The ‘either . . . or’ is not primary; it is derived from the structure of the thrown project. (17)

해석학적 순환과 기대의 존재론적 구조 The function of a fundamental ontology is to disclose the structure which appears as a circle on the methodological plane. It is this structure that Heidegger calls pre-understanding. […] For a fundamental ontology, however, prejudice can be understood only in terms of the anticipatory structure of understanding. The famous hermeneutical circle is henceforth only the shadow, on the methodological plane, of this structure of anticipation. (17-18)

언어의 파생성 ➔ It is therefore necessary to situate discourse in the structures of being, rather than situating the latter in discourse: ‘Discourse is the “meaningful” articulation of the understandable structure of being-in-the-world’ (SZ 161; BT 204).† (18)

하이데거의 맹점: 기존의 텍스트 해석학 / 정신과학의 정초의 문제로 돌아올 수 있는가? ➔ With Heidegger’s philosophy, we are always engaged in going back to the foundations, but we are left incapable of beginning the movement of return which would lead from the fundamental ontology to the properly epistemological question of the status of the human sciences. Now a philosophy which breaks the dialogue with the sciences is no longer addressed to anything but itself. Moreover, it is only along the return route that we could substantiate the claim that questions of exegesis and, in general, of historical critique are derivative. So long as this derivation has not been undertaken, the very movement of transcendence towards questions of foundation remains problematic. (19)

하이데거에서 가다머로 ➔ The core experience around which the whole of Gadamer’s work is organised, and from which hermeneutics raises its claim to universality, is the scandal constituted, at the level of modern consciousness, by the sort of alienating distanciation (Verfremdung) which seems to him to be the presupposition of these sciences. For alienation is much more than a feeling or a mood; it is the ontological presupposition which sustains the objective conduct of the human sciences. The methodology of these sciences ineluctably implies, in Gadamer’s eyes, a distancing, which in turn expresses the destruction of the primordial relation of belonging (Zugehörigkeit) without which there would be no relation to the historical as such. (20) ➔ 그러나 (부정적인 의미의 거리두기만 있는 것은 아니며) 귀속 자체에도 거리두기가 내재되어있다. 귀속에 내재된 거리두기가 곧 해석학으로 하여금 이데올로기 비판과 양립할 수 있게 해주는 지점이다.

가다머: 인식론적 문제로의 귀환과 작용사적 의식 ➔ The very title of the work confronts the Heideggerian concept of truth with the Diltheyan concept of method. The question is to what extent the work deserves to be called Truth AND Method, and whether it ought not instead to be entitled Truth OR Method. […] It is the consciousness of being exposed to history and to its action, in such a way that this action upon us cannot be objectified, because it is part of the historical phenomenon itself. (21)

작용사와의 거리, 지평융합, 언어철학 ➔ […] how is it possible to introduce a critical instance into a consciousness of belonging which is expressly defined by the rejection of distanciation? It is possible, in my view, only insofar as historical consciousness seeks not simply to repudiate distanciation but to assume it. (21) / What enables us to communicate at a distance is thus the matter of the text, which belongs neither to its author nor to its reader. (22)

---

해석학과 이데올로기 비판

해석학과 이데올로기 비판이 정말 양립 불가능한가? ➔ What is at stake can be expressed in terms of an alternative: either a hermeneutical consciousness or a critical consciousness. But is it really so? Is it not the alternative itself which must be challenged? Is it possible to formulate a hermeneutics which would render justice to the critique of ideology, which would show the necessity of the latter at the very heart of its own concerns? (23)

---

현상학과 해석학

후설적 관념론(cf. ⟪이념들⟫의 후기(NW)) vs 해석학 ➔ First thesis: what hermeneutics has ruined is not phenomenology but one of its interpretations, namely its idealistic interpretation by Husserl himself; accordingly, I shall speak henceforth of Husserlian idealism. (61) 

현상학과 해석학의 상호전제 ➔ Second thesis: beyond the simple opposition there exists, between phenomenology and hermeneutics, a mutual belonging which it is important to make explicit. This belonging can be recognised from either position. On the one hand, hermeneutics is erected on the basis of phenomenology and thus preserves something of the philosophy from which it nevertheless differs: phenomenology remains the unsurpassable presupposition of hermeneutics. On the other hand, phenomenology cannot constitute itself without a hermeneutical presupposition. The hermeneutical condition of phenomenology is linked to the role of Auslegung [explication] in the fulfilment of its philosophical project. (61-62)

I. 후설의 관념론에 대한 해석학적 비판

(a) 현상학에서의 궁극적 정당화는 자연과학에서와 같은 연역적 정당화가 아니며, 철학의 무전제적인 시작을 알린다. ➔ There are ‘real beginnings’, or rather ‘paths towards the beginning’, elicited by ‘the absolute absence of presuppositions’. It is thus fruitless to inquire into the motivation for such a radical beginning; there is no reason internal to a domain for raising the question of origin. It is in this sense that justification is a Selbst-Begründung [self-grounding].* (63)

*Q. 잘 이해했는지 모르겠다.

↔︎ 이해에 필연적으로 수반되는 해석학적 유한성이 철학의 무전제적 시작을 불가능하게 만든다. ➔ The latter[the concept of belonging] directly designates the unsurpassable condition of any enterprise of justification and foundation, namely that it is always preceded by a relation which supports it. […] The first declaration of hermeneutics is to say that the problematic of objectivity presupposes a prior relation of inclusion which encompasses the allegedly autonomous subject and the allegedly adverse object. This inclusive or encompassing relation is what I call belonging. The ontological priority of belonging implies that the question of foundation can no longer simply coincide with that of ultimate justification. […] Belonging is expressed by Heidegger in the language of being-in-the-world. (65-66)

(b) 직관적 경험이 연역에 우선하는 현상학의 방법론이다. ➔ I just spoke of strangeness: for is it not astonishing that in spite of (and thanks to) the critique of empiricism, experience in the strict empirical sense is surpassed only in an ‘experience’? This synonymy of Erfahrung signifies that phenomenology is not situated elsewhere, in another world, but rather is concerned with natural experience itself, insofar as the latter is unaware of its meaning. (63)

↔︎ 일종의 ‘예지’ 구조가 무전제적 직관을 불가능하게 만든다. ➔ The Husserlian demand for the return to intuition is countered by the necessity for all understanding to be mediated by an interpretation. […] The dependence of interpretation on understanding explains why explication as well always precedes reflection and comes before any constitution of the object by a sovereign subject. This antecedence is expressed at the level of explication by the ‘structure of anticipation’, which prevents explication from ever being a presuppositionless grasp of a pregiven being [étant]; explication precedes its object in the mode of the Vor-habe, the Vor-sicht, the Vor-Griff, the Vor-Meinung (SZ 150; BT 191). (67)

기대의 구조로 인해 직관의 궁극적인 시작과 끝은 불가능해진다. ➔ In what sense is the development of all understanding in interpretation opposed to the Husserlian project of ultimate foundation? Essentially in the sense that all interpretation places the interpreter in medias res and never at the beginning or the end. (69) 

(c) 주관적 내재의 영역은 의심 불가능한 명증의 영역이다. ➔ The place of plenary intuition is subjectivity. All transcendence is doubtful; immanence alone is indubitable. (63)

↔︎ 정신분석학, 니체의 철학, 이데올로기 비판 등은 자기이해 역시 해석임을 알려온다. ➔ […] the cogito as well seems susceptible to the radical critique which phenomenology otherwise applies to all appearances. [...] Husserl believed that self-knowledge could not be presumptive [like knowledge of the transcendent], because it does not proceed by ‘sketches’ or ‘profiles’. Self-knowledge can, however, be presumptive for other reasons. Insofar as self-knowledge is a dialogue of the soul with itself, and insofar as the dialogue can be systematically distorted by violence and by the intrusion of structures of domination into those of communication, self-knowledge as internalised communication can be as doubtful as knowledge of the object, although for different and quite specific reasons. (69-70)

해석학의 자기비판 기능 ➔ Hermeneutics can do this because, in contrast to phenomenological idealism, the subject of which it speaks is always open to the efficacy of history (to make an allusion to Gadamer’s famous notion of wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein (WM 284; TM 267)). Since distanciation is a moment of belonging, the critique of ideology can be incorporated, as an objective and explanatory segment, in the project of enlarging and restoring communication and self-understanding. The extension of understanding through textual exegesis and its constant rectification through the critique of ideology are properly part of the process of Auslegung. Textual exegesis and critique of ideology are the two privileged routes along which understanding is developed into interpretation and thus becomes itself. (71)

(d) 탐구되어야 할 것은 경험적 주관이 아닌 초월론적 주관이다. ➔ So the reduction does not take place between me and the world, between the soul and the body, between the spirit and nature, but through the pregiven, the existing and the being, which cease to be self-evident and to be assumed in the blind and opaque Seinsglaube [belief in being], becoming instead meaning: meaning of the pregiven, meaning of the existing, meaning of the being. Thus the phenomenological radicality, which severs the transcendental subjectivity from the empirical self, is the same as that radicality which transforms the Seinsglaube into the noematic correlate of the noesis. A noetics or no-ology is therefore distinct from [but parallel with] a psychology. (64)

↔︎ 초월론적 주관주의의 위험, 지향성 원칙과의 배리 ➔ Hermeneutics can be defined no longer as an inquiry into the psychological intentions which are hidden beneath the text, but rather as the explication of the being-in-the-world displayed by the text. […] the phenomenology which arose with the discovery of the universal character of intentionality has not remained faithful to its own discovery, namely that the meaning of consciousness lies outside of itself. The idealist theory of the constitution of meaning in consciousness has thus culminated in the hypostasis of subjectivity. […] The radical way of putting an end to this constantly recurring confusion is to shift the axis of interpretation from the problem of subjectivity to that of the world. (72-73)

(e) 주체는 자유로운 이해의 시작점이기 때문에, 반성에는 자기책임이 따른다. ➔ The philosophical conversion is the supremely autonomous act. What we have called the ethical nuance is thus immediately implied in the foundational act, insofar as the latter can only be self-positing. It is in this sense that it is ultimately self-responsible. (65)

↔︎ 주체는 백지 위에서 최초로 이해하는 주체가 아니라 특정한 상황에 반응하면서 이해하는 주체로 상정되어야 한다. ➔ […] act of subjectivity is not so much what initiates understanding as what terminates it. This terminal act can be characterised as appropriation (Zueignung) (SZ 150; BT 191). […] To appropriate is to make what was alien become one’s own. What is appropriated is indeed the matter of the text. But the matter of the text becomes my own only if I disappropriate myself, in order to let the matter of the text be. So I exchange the me, master of itself, for the self, disciple of the text. (73)

문학적 경험을 통해 비로소 자기가 형성된다.  ➔ This final and radical form of distanciation is the ruin of the ego’s pretension to constitute itself as ultimate origin. The ego must assume for itself the ‘imaginative variations’ by which it could respond to the ‘imaginative variations’ on reality that literature and poetry, more than any other form of discourse, engender. (74)

II. 해석학적 현상학을 향하여

1. 해석학의 현상학적 전제들

(a) 해석학은 현상학과 마찬가지로 의미에 대한 학이다. ➔ The most fundamental phenomenological presupposition of a philosophy of interpretation is that every question concerning any sort of ‘being’ [étant] is a question about the meaning of that ‘being’. […] in order to become a hermeneutical problem – a problem about concealed meaning – the central question of phenomenology must be recognised as a question about meaning. (74)

모든 경험은 표현을 통해 그 자신이 된다. ➔ Experience can be said, it demands to be said. To bring it to language is not to change it into something else, but, in articulating and developing it, to make it become itself. Such is the presupposition of ‘meaning’ which exegesis and philology employ at the level of a certain category of texts, those which have contributed to our historical tradition. Exegesis and philology may well be historically prior to phenomenological awareness, but the latter precedes them in the order of foundation. (75)

의식은 자신의 바깥의 의미를 지향하므로, ⟪논리연구⟫에서와 같은 비관념론적/비주관주의적 현상학이 가능하다. ➔ That consciousness is outside of itself, that it is towards meaning before meaning is for it and, above all, before consciousness is for itself: is this not what the central discovery of phenomenology implies? (76)

Q. 후설에게 의미는 주체의 것인가, 객체의 것인가? ‘안’에 있는가, ‘밖’에 있는가?

(b) 해석학적 거리두기는 일종의 현상학적 환원이다. ➔ Hermeneutical distanciation is not unrelated to the phenomenological epoché, that is, to an epoché interpreted in a non-idealist sense as an aspect of the intentional movement of consciousness towards meaning. For all consciousness of meaning involves a moment of distanciation, a distancing from ‘lived experience’ as purely and simply adhered to. Phenomenology begins when, not content to ‘live’ or ‘relive’, we interrupt lived experience in order to signify it. (76)

Hence hermeneutical distanciation is to belonging as, in phenomenology, the epoché is to lived experience. Hermeneutics similarly begins when, not content to belong to transmitted tradition, we interrupt the relation of belonging in order to signify it. This parallel is of considerable importance if indeed hermeneutics must incorporate a critical moment, a moment of suspicion, from which the critique of ideology, psychoanalysis, etc., can proceed. (77)

(c) 언어는 경험에 비해 파생적이다. ➔ Hermeneutics also shares with phenomenology the thesis of the derivative character of linguistic meaning. […] Even if it is true that all experience has a ‘lingual dimension’ and that this Sprachlichkeit imprints and pervades all experience, nevertheless it is not with Sprachlichkeit that hermeneutic philosophy must begin. (77) ➔ e.g. ⟪진리와 방법⟫은 미학적, 역사적 경험을 언어보다 선행하는 것으로 취급

The reference of the linguistic order back to the structure of experience (which comes to language in the assertion) constitutes, in my view, the most important phenomenological presupposition of hermeneutics. […] The constitution of the complete noema precedes the properly linguistic plane upon which the functions of denomination, predication, syntactic liaison and so on come to be articulated. (78-79)

(d) 객관주의의 근원으로서의 생활세계적 경험에 대한 탐구이다. ➔ […] Husserlian phenomenology itself began to develop the phenomenology of perception in the direction of a hermeneutics of historical experience. […] It will suffice to say that the return from a nature objectified and mathematicised by Galilean and Newtonian science to the Lebenswelt is the very same principle of return which hermeneutics seeks to implement elsewhere, on the plane of the human sciences; for hermeneutics similarly wishes to withdraw from the objectifications and explanations of historical science and sociology to the artistic, historical and lingual experience which precedes and supports these objectifications and explanations. (79)

★생활세계 ➔ [...] the reservoir of meaning, the surplus of sense in living experience, which renders the objectifying and explanatory attitude possible. (80)

2. 현상학의 해석학적 전제들

[...] the necessity for phenomenology to conceive of its method as an Auslegung, an exegesis, an explication, an interpretation. (80)

제 1논리연구에서의 Aufklärung, Deutung 개념 / 제2논리연구에서의 Vorstellung 개념과 해석학에서의 해석 개념 사이의 유사성 ➔ The kinship bears precisely upon the interpretation which is already at work in simple perception and which distinguishes the latter from the mere data of sensation. The kinship consists in the signifying activity which allows both the logical operation and the perceptual operation to be called Auffassung. It seems that the task of clarification can have recourse to a ‘corresponding’ intuition (mentioned in paragraph 21) only by virtue of this kinship between the two types of Auffassung. (82) / Thus perception ‘represents[stellt vor]’ because it is already the seat of a work of interpretation; and it is because it represents that it can, in spite of its singularity, serve as a ‘support’ for specific[종적, 보편적] representations. (83)

제 4데카르트적 성찰에서 제 5데카르트적 성찰로의 이행에서 드러나는 패러독스  ➔ [...] on the one hand, the reduction of all meaning to the intentional life of the concrete ego[자아학] implies that the other is constituted ‘in me’ and ‘from me’; on the other hand, phenomenology must account for the originality of the other’s experience, precisely insofar as it is the experience of someone other than me. The whole of the fifth Meditation is dominated by the tension between these two demands: to constitute the other in me, to constitute it as other. (85)

타인은 나의 지향적 함축 ➔ The paradox is in no way mitigated by recourse to the notions of ‘analogical apprehension’ and ‘pairing’ (Paarung), so long as the role of Auslegung introduced by the fourth Meditation is not perceived. […] what does this ‘apperceptive transposition’, this ‘analogical apperception’, really signify? If the ego and the alter ego are not coupled from the very beginning, they never will be. For this ‘coupling’ implies that the meaning of all my experience refers back to the meaning of the experience of the other. But if the coupling is not originally part of the constitution of the ego for itself, then the ego’s experience will not incorporate any reference to that of others. (86)

★타자는 어떻게 타자인 동시에 나의 지향적 변양물인가(초재인 동시에 내재인가)? ➔ In spite of these admirable descriptions, what remains enigmatic is how the alter ego can be both transcendent and an intentional modification of my monadic life […] It is this enigma, this paradox, indeed this latent conflict between two projects – a project of describing transcendence and a project of constituting in immanence – that the recourse to Auslegung may be able to resolve. (86)

현상학적 해석 = 의미로서의 세계지평에 대한 외현 ➔ Phenomenology is a meditation ‘indefinitely pursued’, because reflection is overwhelmed by the potential meanings of one’s own lived experience. The same theme reappears at the end of the fifth Meditation. Paragraph 59 is entitled ‘Ontological explication and its place within constitutional transcendental phenomenology as a whole’. What Husserl calls ‘ontological explication’ consists in unfolding the layers of meaning (nature, animality, psychism, culture, personality), which together form the ‘world as constituted meaning’. Explication is thus mid-way between a philosophy of construction and a philosophy of description. (87)

지향적 외현(cf. Hua I, 131-2) ➔ […] in thus linking explication to the clarification of horizons, phenomenology seeks to go beyond a static description of experience, a mere geography of the layers of meaning. The processes of transferring from the self towards the other, then towards objective nature and finally towards history, realise a progressive constitution – indeed ultimately a ‘universal genesis’ – of what we naively experience as the ‘life-world’. It is this ‘intentional explication’ which encompasses the two demands that appeared to be in conflict throughout the fifth Meditation […] For Auslegung does nothing more than unfold the surplus of meaning which, in my experience, indicates the place for the other. (87)

The second part of this essay thus refers back to the first: phenomenology and hermeneutics presuppose one another only if the idealism of Husserlian phenomenology succumbs to the critique of hermeneutics. (89)*

★*Q. 정말로 데카르트주의/초월론적 관념론과 해석학적 기획은 양립할 수 없는가?