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철학/현상학

Sebastian Luft, <Subjectivity and Lifeworld in Transcendental Phenomenology> Chapter 1, 3 발췌

Sebastian Luft, Subjectivity and Lifeworld in Transcendental Phenomenology, Northwestern Univerity Press, 2011.

 

Chapter 1: Luft, S. (1998). Husserl's phenomenological discovery of the natural attitude. Continental Philosophy Review, 31(2), 153-170. Hua 인용은 논문에는 미주로 실려있고 책에만 본문 내에 삽입되어있다. 그 중 일부만 포함시켜 발췌한다. 또한 모든 강조는 필자가 한 것이다. 

① 세계의 대상은 언제나 특정한 의미를 가진 대상으로서 지향된다. "Something is always given to our intentional acts in a way of givenness; however, this way of givenness reveals itself already as something in my daily life. For example, this three-dimensional x is given as a cup for drinking, this y as food to eat, this z as a person, more specifically as a friend or stranger, etc. My surroundings are not just a formal system of intentional givenness, but a nexus of meaning."(156)

★ ② '관심' 개념을 통한 '상황'과 '태도'의 정의. "The fact that I always perceive a thing in a certain interest I shall term situation. I am always in a certain situation, in the sense that I always have a certain, specific interest in something. I do not live jumping from one situation to the next as if there were “gaps” in between. Rather I always live in a certain context within a flow of temporal succession. Also, my interest within a situation is not limited to this certain entity, but can be shifted to any other entity in the same form of interest. It is here that the term attitude. comes into play. My specific interest in a certain entity, my situation in other words, is always embraced or surrounded by an attitude."(157)

★ ③ 태도의 대상적 상관자는 지평 또는 세계이다(특수세계[Sonderwelt] 또는 세계 일반). "Hence, an attitude is directed towards an open horizon of possible entities. Analogously to the way an act has its correlative intended object, so we can also say that an attitude has a correlative. [...] This correlative Husserl calls an open horizon or also a world."(157)

④ 지평 또는 세계의 특징은 그것이 주제화된 대상에게 밀려 주제화되지 않는다는 점이다. (그것을 주제화하는 순간, 해당 태도로부터는 거리를 둔 것이 된다.) "Living in a certain attitude and thus viewing certain things within this horizon that correlates to this attitude, I will see the things, but not the horizon in which they appear. This horizon or special world remains unthematic, because the object that I have thematically is that to which I tune my attention."(158)

⑤ 서로를 지시적으로 함축하는 특수지평 또는 특수세계들의 총체로서 '고향세계' 개념의 정의. "The special horizons [...] referentially imply each other, “touch” each other or maybe overlap; they are not separate “worlds,” but make up my life as a whole and the locus in which it is carried out. The universal notion (Inbegriff) or field of this structure of attitudinal multiplicity and the correlative horizons in my natural life as a whole Husserl calls homeworld (Heimwelt). (Hua XV, app. 11, 214) [...] this homeworld is not one world of a single individual, but an intersubjective world, a world of tradition, culture, religion (myths), collective values, i.e. a phenomenon of generativity."(158-9)

⑥ '자연스러움'(또는 익숙함)의 필연적 이면으로서의 '소박성' "The term naturalness is a pure description of my daily life and bears no negative connotation. However, the structure of naturalness can take on a pejorative connotation. This is just the flip side of naturalness and stems, etymologically speaking, from the same root. This side Husserl calls naivety."(159)

cf. Luft는 소박성이 이중의 의미를 가진다고 주장한다. 하나는 주관이 자신이 자연적 태도에 있다는 것을 모른다는 의미에서의 소박성이고, 다른 하나는 해당 자연적 태도가 절대적이라고 잘못 믿는다는 의미에서의 소박성이다. "Hence, the naivety of the natural attitude not only consists in the fact that being in the natural attitude I do not know of being in it, but also in the fact that, since I do not know of it as an attitude, I live in the belief that it is the only possible “way of life.”"(159)

⑦ 고향세계에서의 인식의 독단성 "The style of understanding entities will be biased or, literally, presumptuous. This style will continue in a (homeworldly) concordance (Einstimmigkeit) with what is familiar. Thus, the naivety consists in daily life’s setting of its doxic style of understanding entities as absolute. The doxa sets as absolute that which is in fact only relative. It does not realize that its beliefs are pure beliefs that could be wrong or perspectival, inadequate or biased."(160)

⑧ 학문적 태도의 뿌리에 대한 망각으로서의 '자연주의' 또는 '객관주의' "So this scientific attitude with its sphere of absolute truths, however objective, still rests on the ground of the home attitude. It is an attitude on a higher level, but has its roots and its foundation in the home attitude, because initially it is the individual in his home attitude who realizes the limits and finitude of his relative home attitude and pushes himself away from this very sphere, now discovered to be relative, and strives to reach an absolute viewpoint. [...] This is the case even though it is an absolute sphere that no longer has a necessary link to the home attitude it has sprung from. It is exactly this oblivion of its roots Husserl criticizes as “naturalism” or “objectivism.”"(162)

⑨ 고향에서의 태도와 학문적 태도를 아우르는 자연적 태도의 본질로서의 세계의 존재에 대한 믿음 "What now, we can ask, do all these attitudes have in common? In my devotion to a certain action in a certain attitude, in my working, viewing, contemplating, experimenting etc., I still always believe that the reality or the world I am in, in which I am “doing” these things, exists."(162)

⑩ 고향세계의 일면적 추상으로서의 학문세계, 무한한 고향-태도들의 보편성으로서의 자연적 태도 "As we have said, the scientific, objective attitude can in principle be understood by all home attitudes. This is because the scientific attitude is merely an extrapolation, or abstraction, from a single home attitude [...] The full notion of the natural attitude is hence the universality of an in principle endless number of home attitudes, which in turn break down into subattitudes, all sharing the belief that the world they are resting on as the original arché (Ur-Arche) exists."(163)

❶ 고향세계의 조화로움의 양식으로서의 '정상성' 개념의 정의 "The world as my homeworld is to me a harmonious horizon; the style of my living in the world and understanding it is one of concordance (Einstimmigkeit). Husserl calls this universal style of concordance within my home attitude, without which the world as my homeworld would be simply absurd to me, normality (Hua XV, 133; esp. no. 11, 148-71)."(164)

❷ '비정상성' 개념을 통한 '타자세계'의 정의 "Thus, the normalities of the particular home attitudes collide. To the horizon of the home attitude hence belongs a dark outer horizon. Since this home attitude is constituted by normality, this outer horizon will be the abnormal, that which is principally not integrateable in the normal style of understanding. But we can see that the entity which is abnormal to us in our normality might be normal to the other homeworld. Therefore, it is not an absolute abnormality, rather an other normality that is abnormal to us. The outer horizon of this abnormality, Husserl calls, correlative to the homeworld, the alienworld (Fremdwelt)." (165)

❸ 타자세계라는 의문에 응답함의 결과로서의 소박성의 탈피 "How is it possible to leave the home attitude and ultimately the natural attitude? [...] I believe the answer must lie in the concept of normality, which only makes sense as normality in contrast to the abnormal that lies outside the horizon of our homeworld. This is the alienworld. [...] it is not we that question, but rather the alien itself that intrudes our horizon and calls us into question. So the question coming from that which lies beyond our normal, natural home leads right back to ourselves, thus changing us. This is changed into abnormal and alien that which is for us the most normal, well-known and homelike, that which we never know of in the first place: the natural attitude itself. The alien makes us perceive ourselves in our very everyday existence as alien. [...] In experiencing this, we can never go back into our old self-evident knowledge of ourselves and our world. This is what the loss of naivety is all about. (165)


Chapter 3: Some Methodological Problems Arising in Husserl's Late Reflections on the Phenomenological Reduction(trans. by Jon Burmeister), 모든 강조는 원저자가 한 것이다.

★ ① 현상학적 환원은 방법론 이상의 중요성을 가진다. "Husserl's philosophy of the phenomenological reduction is taken to be a method--and only this--while in his last years it gained for him a far more unviersal meaning and is directly connected with his "metaphysical" standpoint. He viewed it as the most important component of his phenomenology as a whole, and the latter's success depended for him first and foremost on a correct execution and exposition of the reduction. It is above all for this reason that he devoted his final works to ever-new "introductions" to phenomenology--ultimately, new expositions of the reduction."(84)

② 후기의 후설은 어떻게 자연적 태도로부터 환원을 동기부여할 수 있을 것인지의 문제에 대해 고민했다. "Admittedly, Husserl must answer the question of the possibility of a departure in the affirmative [...] He must, ehnce, determine and motivate this very departure from the natural attitude. Additionally, Husserl would never have been content with Merleau-Ponty's assessment that the reduction is never complelety achievable. The reduction is achievable, and completely so--or it is not at all."(86)

자연적 태도의 유연성으로서의 비-소박성 "Rather, all life of consciousness is an abiding modification. Everything depends on bringing this modification reflectively to concsiousness--whereby reflection itself is a modification kath' exochen[par exellence]. [...] As a universal modification it is admittedly more radical, but not fundamentally different from other modifications. [...] The important insight here is: the natural attitude is not at all so "naive" but rather "more critical" than it first appears. This also has a bearing on the traditional relation between naïveté and critique, which needs to be revised; it is not a dialectical relation, but one of mutual embrace, mutual interpenetration, and mutual foundedness."(88-9)

철학적 반성 또는 환원은 자연적 의식삶의 끊임없는 변양에 의해 발생적으로(90) 정초된다. "[...] before something like a radical modification, which completely changes normal life, can be postulated, this must as a possiblity be grounded or, more specifically, fouded (on founding acts). This grounding lies in the fact that the life of consciousness as such is an abiding alteration and transformation. Reflection as a radical modification of consciousness is nothing but an extrapolation[추정] and radicalizing of the normal progression of consciousness, one which proceeds always and unavoidably as modifying [...]"(89) ➔ 이로써 자연적 삶과 초월론적 인식의 영역 사이의 연속성이 배가된다.

⑤ 심리학의 문제는 세계에 속하는 한 층위만 탐구할 수 있는 데 불과함에도 불구하고 세계 전체를 설명하고자 한다는 것이다.  이 문제의 이름은 심리학주의이다. "Psychology as a science of the soul, which brackets out all that is extra-psychical, still stands in the midst of the world, and in doing so thematizes only one layer within this world. Simultaneously, it believes that it is able to thematize the totality of all beings from out this psychical layer, insofar as all that can be experienced must present itself in the psychical as the content of experience (immanent experience). [...] It stands in an essential paradox, that of psychologism."(91)

⑥ 그럼에도 불구하고 심리학과 초월론적 현상학은 평행관계에 있다. "Ultimately, and regardless of how one can solve the problem of psychology's status, the issue comes down to the fact that psychology and phenomenology are two disciplines of one phenomenon, the life of consiousness. The parallel of both disciplines, thus, is a reflection of their subject matter: consciousness. [...] What then is the relation of the mundane and the transcendental Ego?"(93)

★ ⑦ 의식삶에 대한 해석학적 반성으로서의 초월론적 환원 "Negatively expressed: the reduction does not change the fact that the Ego is a person in a practical, social (etc.) world; no new life-task is allocated to it. The reduction remains for Husserl a reflective operation; it can--to take up Husserl's description of phenomenology as "the hermeneutic of the life of consciousness[(Hua XXVII, 177)]--be designated as a "hermeneutical turn" within the life of the Ego, one which makes possible a new and expansive transparence of the Ego regarding its own self. [...] The Ego recognizes itself as through and through "rationally" determined; for a universal transparence of the Ego regarding its own self makes clear to it the fundamental synonymy of subjectivity and reason, provided that "reason" is understood to be [...] all of the capacities of consciousness subject to describable rules."(94)

Q. 과연 자아와 관련된 완전하게 투명한 인식이 가능할까? '해석'이란 본질적으로 '관점적', 즉 '일면적' 해석이 아닌가?

⑧ 역사적으로는 초월론적 환원이 특정한 시점에 일어났으나, 초월론적 삶에 대한 인식의 능력은 인간에게 언제나 이미 내재되어있었다. "The capability for this belongs essentially to the human Ego; it is only a matter of awakening it."(95)

⑨ 초월론적 환원을 통해 자아는 세속적인 모든 것을 초월론적으로 구성하는 자신의 존재의 절대성을 깨달을 수 있다. "The richer possibilities of the transcendental life consist not in a factical broadening of the possibilities of human life [...] but rather in the fact that the Ego recognizes that all of its mundane ways of life carry a transcendental "index" [...]"(95-6)

초월론적인 것의 필연적(의도와 무관한) 세계화 "If the reduction has clarified how to depart from the natural attitude [...] the "correlative" question is raised after the reduction of how the transcendental Ego comports[처신하다] toward its constituted appearance or "manifestation" in the world. This self-objectification of the transcendental in the world appears under the title enworlding. [...] Enworlding is an integral component of the reduction and, not coincidentally, follows upon it necessarily; in it, the movement of the reduction first becomes transparent to itself, provided that the transcendental Ego becomes reflectively conscious of itself as its mundane being. Enworlding is thus a self-critique of the phenomenologizing capacity [...]"(97)

❶ 세계화를 통한 초월론적 현상학의 심리학화에 대한 성찰을 통한 초월론적 소박성의 탈피 "However, in his first straightforwardly executed research he is still naive, insofar as he has still not engaged in any reflection upon his own doing, and thus has not made its necessary ontification conscious to himself. [...] the enworlding psychologizes the transcendental components of meaning."(98)

❷ 초월론적 환원 및 그 수확물 역시 보다 고차원적인 자기비판을 통해 다른 세속의 것들과 마찬가지로 세계화된 것으로서 인식된다. "Everything that is, is worldly, even the phenomenological utterances, but it is only correctly recognized as worldly when it is recognized in ints trascendental origin. [...] there is not a secondary enworlding in the act of phenomenologizing in addition to the primary enworlding, that of "simple" constituting. All experiencing constitutes, and that is: enworlds, be it that of someone in the natural or in the phenomenological attitude; the difference is that the "phenomenologizing" Ego brings the transcendental-enworlding acts to consciousness once again in a higher reflection, and in so doing is critical with regard to its own manner of cognition."(100)