Donn Welton (ed.), The new Husserl: a critical reader, Indiana University Press, 2003 중에서 The Systemacity of Husserl's Transcendental Philosophy - From Static to Genetic Method. 모든 볼드처리는 필자의 것이다.
(1) Welton의 분석에 따르면 후설은 1920년에서 1923년까지 다음의 세 프로젝트들을 통해 현상학의 탐구 범위를 체계적으로 확장시키고자 했다. 이들은 모두 정적 현상학적 방법과 발생적 현상학적 방법 사이의 구분을 공통적인 전제로 한다.
"The first project, the Logic lectures, was largely concerned with an analysis of what he called “passive synthesis” and was an account of perception and the various modalities of experience that bring one to reflective judgment. The second project, his lecture course “Introduction to Philosophy,” was preoccupied with the question of the starting point of a transcendental analysis. But there is a third project [...] During the fall of 1922 and the winter of 1923, the same period when he was giving his “Introduction to Philosophy,” he composed the first three of what are known as the Kaizo articles. In contrast to the Logic lectures, this was a study of “active synthesis” extended beyond acts of judgment to the movements of intellectual culture as a whole. The Kaizo articles were the first published works in which he sketched his own theory of history, a project to which he returned in the later manuscripts and the Crisis."(257)
(2) 정적 분석=범주적 분석
"Husserl later characterizes the working method of Ideas I as “static” analysis [...] a method that gives us general structural descriptions of the various domains of being in correlation to types of mental acts in and through which those domains “show” the general determinations that they have."(260)
"The key to categorial phenomenology is that it is built upon, as it restricts itself to, the relationship between the as- and for-structures, to the relationship between things appearing as something and the one to whom or for whom they appear. By classifying or categorizing the essential forms of cognition, it supplies a typology of intentionality."(262)
"a typology or classification of the different “essential shapes” of noetic-noematic correlations"(262)
"The starting point for categorial analysis is the “division of apperceptions according to regions of objects,” that is, regional ontologies."(263) ➔ 서로 다른 영역의 존재자들은 어떤 상이한 유형의 심리작용을 통해 주어지는가? 각 영역(e.g. 공간적 사물, 정신적 사물, ...) 및 그것을 현시해주는 심리작용의 구조는 어떠한가?
(3) 구성적 분석
"Constitutive phenomenology must penetrate to the underlying modalizations and transformations that give rise to manifest structures. [...] The correlation between achievement and sense—first discovered in a reflection upon the transcendent object given in and through its appearances—is framed as a constitutive condition of that object in its difference from others, and then expanded through an account of the various “levels” or “layers,” nested in a given categorial type, that motivate “the achievement of transcendence.” Constitutive phenomenology provides an account of regions by recourse to the way they are “built up.” It accounts not only for structure but also for “origins.”"(262)
"a description of the "modal modifications" that "encompass all categories of apperception," both passive and active."(262-3)
"While the focus in categorial phenomenology is on the identity and difference of eidetic structures of a given field, the concern in constitutive phenomenology is to trace the implicit “origin” of those structures. For example, it examines the transformations by which everyday speech becomes rigorous propositional discourse, or the levels of experience implicit in what we might call epistemic perception."(263) ➔ Welton은 FTL에서의 논의를 발생적 현상학이 아닌 구성적 현상학의 소관으로 분류한다(⟪Origin of Meaning⟫ 참고).
(4) 발생적 분석
"Genetic phenomenology somehow bridges two extremes. On the one hand, there are the macrocosmic analyses of ethical and cultural contributions to our present understanding and experience of the world—including the entire history of scientific and philosophical thought, as we find in the Kaizo articles Husserl wrote between 1922 and 1924, and then again in the Crisis. On the other hand, he offers detailed microcosmic accounts of precultural, structural components of our most rudimentary perceptions and the way in which they yield a shared experience of nature."(275)
"Genetic analysis moves beyond Husserl’s static analysis by rescinding three “abstractions” that made his first structural characterization of intentionality possible. First, recall that the “pure ego” is initially described as a “pole” of unity definable only in terms of the acts and actions that it serves to relate. [...] (276) In his later work, however, Husserl recasts the pure ego as an “abstract” structure of the “concrete ego,” which has yet other transcendental features. Borrowing from Leibniz, Husserl calls this ego the “monad.” It is not “an empty pole of identity” but a “fixed and abiding personal ego.” It possesses general capabilities or capacities, whose exercise leads to the acquisition of dispositional tendencies to experience things one way rather than another, to the acquisition of “habitualities.” In addition, it is always understood as internally connected to others, and it shares a history with them. As a result, the notion of the subject is expanded into that of the person in community. / Second, the world, which Ideas I reduced and drew into the sphere of “immanence” as a counter-pole, as “something identical” posited by consciousness, is reframed as a concrete horizon that has undergone a process of sedimentation in which past achievements have been deposited into its being. In short, the static notion of intentional consciousness is now elaborated as intentional life; the first notion of world is recast as life-world. / Third, Husserl reintegrates the analysis of time-consciousness into his account of transcendental subjectivity. [...] As he puts it in 1922, “Time, seen from within, is the form of intentional genesis.”"(275-6)
"The distinct subject matter of genetic analysis is so difficult to understand because, in the final analysis, it does not describe yet another layer in the constitution of things but, I would suggest, is the deepest transcendental account of the constitution of the horizon itself. In turning to the horizon itself and understanding it as temporal, genetic analysis studies the dynamic and developing interplay of background and context against and within which experience is deployed. Thus genetic analysis deals not with the distinct temporal character attending various modalizations of different types of experiences, for this is handled in constitutive analysis, but with the becoming of the horizon itself. In the final analysis, it accounts for the historicity of intentional life. [...] Ultimately, genetic analysis accounts for the invisible nexus of significance without which things would have no place, no situated intelligibility, no concrete presence, and without which our actions and acts would have no direction, no orientation, no concrete effects. But this is also a dynamic account: our acts and actions reshape and reorganize the horizon in which they are situated."(277)
cf. Klaus Held, Husserl's Phenomenological Method & Husserl's Phenomenology of the Life-World
잠재적인 경험의 가능성을 지시하는 지평은 그 자체로 새 경험의 동기가 된다(25) / ⟪이념들⟫에서의, 소여 방식의 차이(음영의 유무)를 통한 세속적 대상의 존재 방식과 의식의 존재 방식 사이의 구분(26) / 데카르트에게서 영향 받은, 내재-초재 개념쌍의 문제점--'내재적 초재'로서의 지향적 대상이 해당 구분법을 무용하게 만듦(27) / 순수자아=객관화로부터 자유로운 자아=자유로운 자아(29) / 대상 구성의 현상학으로서의 정적 현상학, 세계 구성의 현상학으로서의 발생적 현상학(52) / 공동체의 집단적 의식에 의한 근원적 정초(52) / Einströmen(60)
★상호주관성 "What motivates me to transcend my primordial sphere toward what is ¤rst foreign to me, that is, to other subjects, toward another subject? [...] Now, if it is possible that I am motivated in my primordial world toward the transcendence of this world, then this can only happen by my appresenting something not present in something that is primordially present. This present is the body of the other person, a body which, from within my primordiality, I do not yet know is the living body of another person. [...] Based upon what we have said so far, the fundamental task for Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity is to differentiate the appresentation of our experience of foreign egos from the appresentation of our normal perception of things (where our perception of things does not exceed my sphere of ownness), thus bringing out the special features of foreign-ego appresentation. It is a very subtle, but also highly problematic, analysis."(50) / "Thus in the final analysis, the subjects of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity encounter each other as “others” because their existence in the world is bound to the absolute Here of each individual’s living-body, and because these living-bodies—as the bodies that belong to them—can never occupy the same There at the same time. Herein lies the originary source of “the experience of foreign egos.”"(52)
★발생적 현상학의 두 탐구영역인 수동적 발생과 능동적 발생 "There must be certain horizons that consciousness “always already” has at its disposal, that is, horizons that have never been founded at one specific time through an active, apperceptive achievement. Therefore, the activity of primordial founding presupposes a passive genesis of elementary horizons. This genesis has no beginning that sets it up in the inner history of consciousness; rather, it takes place at all times[전시간적이다]. The constitutional events that are “underneath” the level of perception are involved in this genesis, especially the original development of time in the “living present,” “association,” and kinesthetic consciousness. All of these passive processes, which are continually in motion, already prefigure activity. For this reason, there is a smooth transition from passive genesis to the second area with which the theory of genetic constitution is concerned, the active genesis of primordial foundation[문화]. This activity, for its part, remains surrounded by passivity by means of the “secondary passivity” of habitualization. / Only at this point, with the phenomenology of active and passive genesis, do we find a phenomenology that systematically unifies all constitutional events to one whole interrelation; this discovery further engenders the idea that consciousness does not constitute isolated objects but, instead, constitutes horizons and thereby the world. Therefore, the phenomenological method finally becomes transcendental philosophy only through an inquiry into the whole of existence with regard to its appearing for consciousness."(53) ➔ 정적 현상학만으로는 부족하다.
★근대 학문의 문제점: 주관성의 지평에 대한 망각 "Husserl shows how the methods of modern research, which are indifferent to horizons, arise from a pre-modern science that is tied to horizons by showing how the modern study of nature has been mathematized."(56) / "The methodical research of modern science, which is persistently placed upon mathematical foundations, becomes an approach to the world as an “infinite idea” that can never end; this means that it acquires the character of unending progress. This presupposes, though, that “the world” that science approaches in its progress exists prior to this progress and independent of it. Through this, however, the world (as science’s “infinite idea”) appears as an object that is free from all embeddedness in horizons. Our natural “belief of being” thus works itself into an extreme in modern science: in the being-in-itself of the world, all trace of any reference to the subject and the perspectivity of its world-experience is extinguished."(57)
★유럽 학문의 위기: 생활세계와의 연관성 상실, 그로 인한 자기책임의 증발 "The “crisis of European sciences” of which Husserl speaks in the title of his late work is the loss of meaning that results from such a purely subject-irrelative world that, if it really were to exist, would abolish all human responsibility. […] Husserl exposes this forgottenness [of subject-relativity of all objectivities] in the Crisis, reminding us that the belief in a totally de-perspectivized world, one which exists absolutely in itself, can only be primordially founded by transcending a comprehensive, albeit unthematic, subject-relative horizon. / Husserl calls this comprehensive horizon the “life-world,” differentiating it from the world as a general object of scientific research and especially from the modern world as characterized by science. The modern scientific world refers back to the pre-scientific life-world through its sense of being an absolutely subject-irrelative world, which it acquired through its primordial foundation; without such a contrast to the subject-relative world, the ground would fall out from underneath this absolute world. Accordingly, the modern transcendence of what is scientifically objective remains tied to subjective activity; even this transcendence cannot escape the universal correlation between objectivity and its subjective-situated appearing in manners of givenness. The scientific world, which supposedly exceeds the subject-relativity of the life-world’s horizons, is still caught in the tow of this subject-relativity. In other words, the objects of science are sense-formations that owe their existence to the subjective achievements of a particular theoretical and logical praxis—and this praxis itself belongs to life in the life-world."(58)
★발생적 침전이 드러내주는 생활세계의 역사성 "With the theory of streaming-in, a new aspect of the life-world is revealed. In its basic meaning as intuited world, “life-world” can be used as a term of contrast to the unintuited world of science. As a consequence of genetic sedimentation, however, the objectified results of any praxis that transcends intuition—and this includes those results of modern technological praxis based upon idealization—flow into the intuitable horizons of non-scientific praxis. The transformed world that appears unthematically in these horizons is also the life-world. Thus “life-world” loses its character as a contrasting concept. The universal horizon, not only for pre-scientific praxis (which is bound to its horizons and thus is bound to intuition), but also for the praxis of gaining knowledge in modern research (which radically transcends intuition), is the life-world. This means that, in this sense, the life-world in its “universal concretion,” as Husserl says, is nothing other than a comprehensive world, the universal horizon to which the “belief of being” of the natural attitude refers. Of course, this concept of the world is essentially richer compared to its earlier formulation; the world of the natural attitude is now a world that enriches itself historically through the praxis that takes place in it and its sedimentation, through “streaming-in.” It is the concrete, historical world."(60)
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